For the final article in my series on how policing could change under President Trump, I’m going to look at the Department of Justice practice of using consent decrees to push for reform in local police departments. In this context, a consent decree is a binding agreement between a police department and the DOJ that is reached as a settlement after the DOJ sues the police department for an alleged pattern of civil rights violations. This is something that is widely expected to decline under Jeff Sessions’ leadership.Here’s an article that provides an interesting, if perhaps left-leaning, look at that expectation. But the prediction itself shouldn’t be considered partisan; Sessions expressed concern about consent decrees during his confirmation hearings and, since becoming Attorney General, has ordered a review of police reform agreements. Under Sessions, the DOJ also requested (and was denied) a delay in implementation of a consent decree with Baltimore that was finalized during Loretta Lynch’s last days in office. More on that consent decree, with a link to the full text for especially wonky types, here.
Do consent decrees work?
Though the DOJ considers consent decrees (and other reform agreements) to be their primary tool in policing reform and civil rights enforcement, there hasn’t been much study as to their effects. The exception to this is a recent University of Texas-Dallas study that looked at civil rights lawsuits before, during, and after consent decrees were established. The available sample size was small–they looked at 23 police departments–but there appeared to be a reduction in civil rights lawsuits while consent decrees were in place, and an increase once they expired. The study acknowledged that there could be various explanations for this, but concluded that the consent decrees had a modest effect. Article and report here.
The effect of consent decrees
The purpose–and, by one measure, possible success–of consent decrees are described above. But that would be a large expense to reform just a handful of departments. The hope is that these very public agreements can influence other departments and inform thinking by groups such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police or the Police Executive Research Forum as to recommendations and best practices.
Police departments can also benefit tangibly from such voluntary agreements. They can help to rehabilitate an embattled department’s image by showing concrete ways that they are working to improve and establishing clear goals–something that doesn’t always happen outside some kind of agreement. And the burden of increased training, equipment, and salary costs that may come from this agreement may pale in comparison to the high costs of civil rights lawsuits that may potentially be avoided.
An example of a city voluntarily seeking to implement these kinds of changes is Chicago: rather than just breathing a sigh of relief at the reduced possibility, with Trump’s election, that there will be a consent decree between Chicago and the DOJ, Chicago mayor Rahm Emanuel announced he’s moving forward with police reform with or without the Justice Department.
So what will change under Trump?
To continue the mantra of this series, not too much. The Obama administration opened 25 investigations into police departments and enforced 14 existing consent decrees. Considering there are some 18,000 law enforcement agencies in the United States, that’s a drop in the bucket. The odds that your police department is one of these are extremely low (though they certainly rise if you live in a major city).
For those whose cities are affected, police reform could be slowed. Chicago aside, many cities and departments are not going to be eager to spend potentially millions of dollars retooling their training and recruiting practices if they’re not being forced to. This is especially true in many Republican-controlled states, where property tax caps are stretching city funding even a successful economy. Reform will continue, though, in a reduced way; while the impetus to spend is aided by lawsuits and consent decrees, the impetus to improve is preexisting and is encouraged by public opinion and media attention.
That last point is why I don’t think the impact will ripple far beyond those departments that are, or could have been, directly impacted by consent decrees. It’s media, national consciousness, and evolving best practices that drive the vast majority of police reform in the country; not attention to the specifics of consent decrees (in fact, consent decrees and reform in non-consent decree cities are probably informed by common sources, rather than having a causal relationship with one another).
Policing is local. Police departments are defined by their communities. The impact the federal government can have outside major initiatives like consent decrees is, I think, minimal. So don’t expect major changes on the streets of your home town.